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ABSTRACT
We present STAR: a novel system aimed at solving the com-
plex issue of “p-hacking” and false discoveries in scientific
studies. STAR provides a concrete way for ensuring the ap-
plication of false discovery control procedures in hypothesis
testing, using mathematically provable guarantees, with the
goal of reducing the risk of data dredging. STAR generates
an efficiently auditable certificate which attests to the va-
lidity of each statistical test performed on a dataset. STAR
achieves this by using several cryptographic techniques
which are combined specifically for this purpose. Under-
the-hood, STAR uses a decentralized set of authorities (e.g.,
research institutions), secure computation techniques, and
an append-only ledger which together enable auditing of
scientific claims by 3rd parties and matches real world trust
assumptions. We implement and evaluate a construction
of STAR using the Microsoft SEAL encryption library and
SPDZ multi-party computation protocol. Our experimental
evaluation demonstrates the practicality of STAR in multi-
ple real world scenarios as a system for certifying scientific
discoveries in a tamper-proof way.
1 INTRODUCTION
According to a 2016 Nature Magazine survey, over 70% of
researchers failed to reproduce published results of other
scientists and over 50% failed to reproduce their own published
results [2]. The “Replication Crisis”, plaguing almost all sci-
entific domains, has serious and far reaching consequences
on the continued progress of scientific discoveries. Unfortu-
nately, solutions addressing the problem are few and often
ineffective for two reasons: 1) current solutions either fail
to take into account real world trust assumptions (e.g., by
trusting researchers to carefully apply false discovery con-
trol protocols) or 2) are overly restrictive (e.g., by requiring
independent replication of results prior to publishing or pre-
registration of hypotheses). Moreover, these solutions fail to
take into account modern approaches to data analysis, specif-
ically the abundance of existing data and means by which to
explore it, and impose overly stringent requirements.
The replication crisis is, in part, a direct result of these
problems and what is formally known as the Multiple Com-
parisons Problem (MCP). With every hypothesis tested over
a dataset (using any type statistical testing procedure), there
is a small probability of a chance, i.e., false positive, discov-
ery with no real basis to the population being studied. With
every additional statistical test performed on the data, the
chance of encountering such a random correlation increases.
This can be intentionally exploited to “fabricate” signifi-
cant discoveries and, if done in systematically, is referred to
as “HARKing“ [35], “p-hacking” [25] or “data dredging”.
While a variety of statistical techniques exist to control
for the MCP by setting threshold on the false discovery rate
(FDR), i.e., the ratio of false-positives to true-positives over a
sequence of hypotheses [4, 17], there is surprisingly almost
no support to ensure that researchers and analysts actually
use them. Rather individual research groups rely on often
varying data analysis guidelines and trust in their group
members to abide by the control procedures correctly which,
unfortunately, rarely works in the real world. This is because
1) making even one simply mistake in the application of
the control procedure can result in a false discovery and
2) there is no means of guaranteeing that each researcher
carefully applied the control procedure (or, didn’t intention-
ally deviate from the procedure to get a “significant” (false)
discovery). Things get even worse when the same data is
analyzed by several institutions or teams since guarding
against false discoveries requires a coordinated effort. It is
currently close to impossible to reliably employ statistical
procedures, such as the Bonferroni [17] method, that guard
against p-hacking across collaborators. It only requires one
member to “misuse” the data (intentionally or otherwise) and
detecting, let alone recovering from such incidents is next to
impossible. This problem is perhaps further exacerbated by
the pressure on PhD students and PIs to publish [40], “publi-
cation bias” [15] as papers with significant results are more
likely to be published, and the increasing trend to share and
make datasets publicly available for any researchers to use
in studies. Therefore, after examining the state of affairs, it is
perhaps not surprising that scientific community is plagued
by false discoveries [3, 27, 28, 30].
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To illustrate this problem concretely, consider a publicly
available dataset such as MIMIC III [32]. This dataset con-
tains de-identified health data associated with ≈ 40, 000
critical care patients. MIMIC III has already been used in
various studies [23, 26, 38] and it is probably one of the
most (over)analyzed clinical datasets and therefore prone
to “dataset decay” [46]. As such, any new discovery made
on MIMIC runs the risk of being a false discovery. Even if a
particular group of researchers follow a proper FDR control
protocol, there is no control over happens across different
groups and tracking hypotheses at a global scale poses many
of its own challenges. It is therefore hard to judge the validity
of any insight derived from such a dataset [46].
A solution to guarantee validity of insights commonly
used in clinical trials — preregistration of hypotheses [12]
— falls short in these scenarios since the data is collected
upfront without knowing what kind of analysis will be done
later on. Perhaps more promising is the use of a hold-out
dataset. The MIMIC author, for example, could have released
only 30K patient records as an “exploration” dataset and hold
back 10K records as a “validation” dataset. The exploration
dataset can then be used in arbitrary ways to find interest-
ing hypotheses. However, before any publication is made
by a research group using the dataset, all hypotheses must
be (re)tested for statistical significance over the validation
dataset. Unfortunately, in order to use the validation dataset
more than once, we run into the same probem: every hy-
pothesis over the validation dataset has to be tracked and
controlled for. Furthermore, the data owner (the MIMIC au-
thor in this case) needs to provide this hypothesis validation
service. This is both a burden for the data owner as well as a
potential risk. Researchers need to trust the data owner to
apply necessary control procedures and to objectively evalu-
ate their hypotheses, which, unfortunately does not always
align with real world incentive structures.
The above example illustrates the motivation behind the
need for a system that addresses these problems.With STAR,
our goal is to create a system that guarantees the va-
lidity of statistical test outcomes and allows readers
(and/or reviewers) of publications to audit them for
correctness, all without introducing unnecessary bur-
dens on data provider and researchers. Using crypto-
graphic techniques to certify outcomes of statistical tests
and by introducing a decentralized authority, we eliminate
the risk of data-dredging (intentional and otherwise) by re-
searchers using a dataset. STAR can be used in various set-
tings, including cases where the data is public and only the
hold-out data is fed into STAR (as in the example above), in
settings where a few research groups collaborate on com-
bined data, or even within single teams where lab managers
can opt to use STAR as a way to prevent unintentional false
discoveries, assign accountability and foster reproducibility.
1.1 Contributions
• We present a novel system for preventing p-hacking
using cryptographic techniques which provide (math-
ematical) guarantees on the validity of each tested
hypotheses during analysis, even in settings where re-
searchers are not trusted to apply control procedures
correctly, while also ensuring full auditability of all
results obtained through STAR.
• We implement and evaluate STAR on four widely used
statistical tests (Student’s t-test, Pearson’s correlation,
Chi-squared and ANOVA F-test) to demonstrate the
applicability of STAR to real world scenarios.
• We describe how a common false discovery control
procedure known as α-investing can be applied with
STAR to provide full control over the data analysis
phase in a certifiable manner.
To the best of our knowledge, STAR is the first crypto-
graphic solution to the problem of p-hacking by providing
guarantees (in the form of tamper-proof certificates) on the
validity of all insights gleaned from a dataset. We believe
that STAR is the first system to address the long standing
problem of discovery certification across scientific domains
and achieves this with minimal overhead on researchers and
data providers.
2 DESIGN
Our design of STAR is motivated by the following obser-
vations. The data owner cannot release a dataset D to the
researchers directly since it creates a possibility for p-hacking
(e.g., researchers can run tests privately and report only favor-
able results without controlling for false discoveries). There-
fore, any system which addresses p-hacking must “hide” the
raw data from researchers. With this in mind, we begin by
describing several initial design ideas and discuss their limi-
tations. This will serve as a motivation for why we choose
the design and construction described in § 2.2 and § 5. We
then describe use some foreseeable use cases of our design
in § 3.
2.1 Strawman Designs
The Trusted Authority Scheme.
The simplest scheme is to assume a trusted authority (3rd
party) which has full access to the unencrypted dataset. Re-
searchers then perform statistical tests on the dataset by
querying the authority who executes the computations on
their behalf and returns only the result of the test.
Unfortunately, there are two immediate problems with
such a design. The solution requires that the data owner,
the researchers, and the auditors trust the authority when it
comes to storing the dataset, correctly executing statistical
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Figure 1: High-level overview of STAR. Data owners upload datasets to the network of computing servers. Re-
searchers proceed to compute statistical tests over the dataset using secure computation that is logged on a public
log. An auditor can examine the log to determine the validity of a given discovery.
tests, and applying the control procedure. While this can
work in certain isolated cases, often real world parties have
conflicting incentives that make finding such an authority
challenging. For example, consider a drug company releasing
a dataset for public use but researchers don’t fully trust the
company to evaluate each hypothesis objectively. Moreover,
there is not way to verify the actions of the authority, i.e.,
ensure that each statistical test was computed correctly and
all p-values reported, etc., meaning that it must be trusted
blindly.
The Secure Enclave Scheme. A more viable alternative to
the above scheme is to have a trusted secure processor [45]
with a strict interface which only allows for the evaluation
of statistical tests. In such a scheme, the data owner encrypts
the dataset using the enclave’s public key which allows the
enclave to execute statistical tests by first decrypting the
dataset in secure memory and then evaluating the statistical
test. The enclave can then reveal the result along with a
digital signature authenticating the computation. However,
such a design suffers from similar problems as the design
involving a singe trusted authority: namely, it is now the
secure enclave and the machine on which it runs that have
to be trusted in the process to guarantee computation are
performed [11, 41].
The Multi-party Computation Scheme. The secure en-
clave approach motivates the idea of distributing trust using
multiple parties. For example, instead of having one entity
in control of the data, a dataset can be shared among a set
of parties which can collectively compute over their shares
but cannot individually access the shared data [6, 7, 43]. This
takes care of the guaranteed output problem and provides
the means for ensuring all computations are accounted for
provided some threshold number of parties follow proto-
col correctly. While on the surface this may appear as good
solution, there are several barriers when it comes to practi-
cality. Computing statistical tests over such a shared dataset
requires general multi-party computation which quickly be-
comes impractical due to high network overheads needed
to evaluate functions using the secret shared data [7, 14, 33].
In general, multi-party computation is only practical when
it comes to evaluating simple functions with few shared in-
puts [14, 33] This motivates our main design which uses
minimal multi-party computation and other secure compu-
tation techniques to create a practical scheme.
2.2 STAR Framework
With the initial design attempts described above, we are
ready describe the design of STAR, which addresses all the
problems mentioned in the strawman ideas. We desire a
general solution which fits well with real world trust as-
sumptions and incentives. The design of STAR achieve these
requirements by using two cryptographic building blocks.
Specifically, we use secure computation and a distributed
ledger (covered in the following section), which are com-
bined in a special way to achieve the desired goal building
a system for conducting auditable hypothesis testing while
remaining practical. Figure 1 provides a design overview of
the system.
At a high level, the data owner encrypts a dataset D and
releases the (encrypted) dataset publicly or to a set of re-
searchers. The encryption scheme used is “special” in the
sense that encrypted values can be used as inputs to func-
tions, and the functions evaluated over the encrypted data,
without knowledge of the secret key needed to decrypt the
values. Such schemes are called homomorphic encryption
schemes. Researchers use the encrypted dataset, denoted [D],
to compute statistical tests (encoded as an arithmetic circuit)
using the homomorphic properties of the scheme. However,
one problem remains: once the statistical test is evaluated,
the result is still encrypted and researchers do not have the
secret key needed to decrypt it. One trivial solution is to send
the result to the data owner who then uses the secret key
to decrypt the result. However, this requires the data owner
to be online in order process such decryption requests and
furthermore places full trust in the data owner to correctly
report results, which, as we mention above we would like
to avoid. Moreover, this can be especially problematic in
scenarios where the dataset is comprised of multiple data
sources since there is only one secret key.
In STAR, we distribute the power to decrypt ciphertexts to
a set of parties (servers) which each hold a share of the secret
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key, but, crucially, cannot decrypt on their own using their
share of the key. Parties can decrypt if and only if they “agree”
to do so collectively; thus preventing any subset of rogue
parties from decrypting results on their own and colluding
with researchers.
When parties decrypt the statistical test result, they also
keep a public log of the action which guarantees that each
revealed statistic is recorded in a tamper-proof and auditable
way. This latter requirement ensures that all statistical tests
executed on [D] are recorded, in sequence, and makes it
possible for anyone to verify whether false discovery control
procedures were applied correctly. We elaborate on these
important requirements in subsequent sections.
3 USE CASES
We describe several distinct and highly relevant scenarios
where STAR is directly applicable. We hope these scenar-
ios provides evidence for both the utility of STAR and the
relevance of the system for addressing false discoveries.
First scenario. A data owner wishes to release a dataset
for public research use but wants to prevent the data from
being overanalyzed and false discoveries being extracted
from the data as a result. As is usually done in such cases,
the data owner partitions the dataset into an exploration and
a validation dataset. The exploration dataset is released to
the public without any restrictions on how statistical tests
should be computed. The validation dataset is encrypted in
such a way that results computed on the dataset are only
made available through STAR: researchers wishing execute
tests on the validation dataset must do so by requesting the
parties in STAR to reveal the result.
Using the exploration dataset, researchers independently
form hypotheses about the data. Prior to publishing the
results, they validate each hypothesis over the validation
dataset via STAR. This guarantees that all validated hypothe-
sis remain auditable and all computed p-values are accounted
for in a tamper-proof, timestamped sequence on the logmain-
tained by the decrypting parties. The publication can then
be validated by auditors (e.g., reviewers) to ensure that the
researchers’ hypothesis was accepted (resp. rejected) in a
way that controls for false discoveries and that the insights
therein are valid. This ensures that the publication’s claims
are statistically significant (within the alleged error bounds)
and guarantees that no p-hacking or other forms of data
dredging occurred during the analysis.
Second scenario. STAR also extends to setting where mul-
tiple data owners contribute to a collective dataset and want
to ensure that their data is not misused. Consider a scenario
where two separate research groups (that potentially don’t
trust each other with their data) have datasets consisting of
similar attributes. For example, consider the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in the United States and Chinese Food
and Drug Administration (CFDA) in China. Assume that both
administrations have data about a new drug claiming to cure
Alzheimer’s disease. Both the FDA and CFDA use their own
respective datasets to explore the data and release their re-
spective datasets in encrypted form such that tests can only
be computed through STAR. Once both organization have
found interesting hypotheses in their own datasets, they
use the other organization’s data as a validation dataset by
testing hypotheses through STAR. In other words, each orga-
nization uses its own data to determine interesting insights
and proceeds to validate each other’s hypotheses using the
other organization’s data. Since all validations are logged in
STAR, results remain auditable. Moreover, the data of each
organization remains private (e.g., the FDA does not learn
CFDA’s data, except for the result of a statistical test).
Third scenario. A data owner wishes to release sensitive
data for research purposes but is required to comply with
stringent regulatory demands for privacy (e.g., as required
by the European GDPR regulation [47]). Even allowing re-
searchers to compute statistical tests can be a violation under
such privacy laws. This results in potentially useful data be-
ing left outside of the reach of the research community. Using
STAR, however, it becomes possible to accommodate privacy
needs by only allowing researchers to test for statistical sig-
nificance (i.e., not even revealing the p-value for a statistical
test, which we describe in a following section). STAR can
be extended to only reveal whether or not a given hypothe-
sis should be accepted (resp. rejected) while simultaneously
controlling for false discoveries.
4 TECHNICAL DETAILS
We now turn to describing the security properties we require
and explain how STAR can be used to certify the correct
application of discovery control procedures.
4.1 Security Goals
In order adequately present and analyze the guarantees of
STAR, we must first establish a set of security goals. At a
high level, STAR aims to achieve the following goals which
guarantee correctness of the system. We outline the goals in
this section and formalize them in § 7.
Correctness. Statistical tests computed on the encrypted
dataset [D] must be correct, i.e, the p-value of a test com-
puted in STAR has to be equivalent to the p-value computed
through standard statistical packages (e.g., MATLAB and
SciPy) over the unencrypted D.
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Confidentiality. The only information revealed about D
is the results of statistical tests which ensures that false
discoveries are fully controlled for and no hypothesis can
be tested outside of STAR’s interface. In other words, STAR
does not “leak” data about the D when statistical tests are
evaluated (more than the result of the statistical test).
Access control. In many cases, it is desirable to provide
access to only a set of approved researchers. We require that
STAR have a mechanism in place for enforcing access control,
though it is not an inherent requirement. If an access control
policy is set, then statistical tests onD can only be executed
by the set of approved researchers.
Auditability. For all hypotheses evaluated through STAR,
the resulting p-values can be checked for their statistical
significance with respect to the false discovery control proce-
dure used. Crucially, anyone can audit the correctness
of a statistical test and can do so using only publicly
available information andwithout interactingwith re-
searchers or the computing parties.
4.2 Threat Model
STAR provides provable guarantees to the four properties
outlined in § 4.1 under the following threat model. Our se-
curity assumptions are with respect to the data owner(s),
computing parties (e.g., different institutions and research
labs), and researchers evaluating their hypotheses through
STAR.
Data Owner.We make the necessary assumption that the
data owner does not collude with the researchers who run
the statistical tests. This assumption is required given that a
malicious owner has unfettered access to the (unencrypted)
dataset D and can thereby trivially avoid executing tests
through STAR, only “testing” results known to be signifi-
cant ahead of time without applying the necessary control
procedure.
Computing Servers. Computing parties are collectively
in possession of the decryption key, however, none of the
parties individually have access to the unencrypted data D.
The dataset remains unknown to the servers provided at least
one of the servers follows protocol correctly. If the parties are
also maintaining the distributed log on which statistical test
results are recorded, we assume that a majority of the parties
are honest when it comes to maintaining the correctness of
the log.
Researchers.We assume that researchers are malicious and
interested in gaining as much information on D as possi-
ble (for the purpose of bypassing control procedures and
falsely certifying discoveries). To this end, we assume that
researchers are interested in abusing the system with the
goal of extracting as many insights as possible and avoiding
applying the false discovery control procedure. To provide
accountability and prevent other forms of attacks, we require
a secure public key infrastructure which identifies individual
researchers by their public key and assume that all messages
exchanged between researchers and computing servers are
digitally signed during protocol execution.
4.3 Controlling False Discoveries
An important first step in realizing the construction of STAR
is understanding how false discovery control procedures are
used in the data analysis phase. In order to certify discoveries,
it is necessary to use the (ordered) sequence of p-values
computed over dataset. The sequence is then used to bound
the false discovery rate (FDR) during or after analysis.
While standard procedures such as Bonferroni [17] must
be applied a posteriori of the data analysis (once all hy-
potheses have been tested), in STAR, we desire a method
for controlling the FDR in a streaming fashion, ideally with-
out knowledge or restriction on future tests. Fortunately,
there is a common false discovery control procedure known
as α-investing [20] which achieves just that. The α-investing
procedure is a standard choice for controlling false discov-
eries in practice when the total number of hypotheses is
unknown ahead of time (e.g., in exploration settings) [51, 52].
We describe the intuitive version of the procedure below and
we refer the reader to [20, 51] for more formal definitions
and proofs which are outside the scope to understanding
this work.
The α-investing procedure works by assigning, to each
hypothesis, a “budget” α from an initial “α-wealth.” If the p-
value of the null hypothesis being considered is above some
α the null hypothesis is accepted and some budget is lost, oth-
erwise the null is rejected and the available budget increases.
Choosing α depends on the “investment strategy” [51] and
is ultimately left as a choice for the analyst. We present a
common investment strategy in Procedure 1 which allows
for a (theoretically) unbounded number of statistical tests to
be executed over the dataset.
More formally, for the jth null hypothesis,Hj , being tested,
Hj is assigned a budget α j > 0. Let pj denote the p-value asso-
ciated with the result of the statistical test used to determine
the statistical significance ofHj . The null is rejected if pj ≤ α j ,
otherwise it is accepted. In the case that Hj is rejected, the
testing procedure obtains a “return” on investment γ ≤ α .
On the other hand, if the Hj is accepted, α j/(1 − α j ) wealth
is subtracted from the remaining α-wealth. Therefore, the
remaining wealth, denotedW (j), after the jth statistical test
is set according to:
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W (j + 1) =
{
W (j) + γ if pj ≤ α j ,
W (j) − α j1−α j if pj > α j
(1)
Procedure 1: InvestmentRule(α , β ,γ) [51]
1 W (0) = α ; // initial wealth
2 foreach i ← 1, 2, . . . do
3 αi = min
(
α ,
W (i−1)(1−β )
1+W (i−1)(1−β )
)
;
4 pi ← test(Hi ); // p-value for hypothesis Hi
5 if pi < αi then
6 W (i) =W (i − 1) + γ ;
7 else
8 W (i) =W (i − 1) − αi1−αi ;
In STAR, the parametersW (0), α , β , and γ can be set as
static constant or determined by more complex mechanisms,
as seen fit. The important takeaway in understanding
STAR is that given all p-values computed onD, up to
the current test, it is easy to determine whether any
given hypothesis should be accepted (resp. rejected)
based on the corresponding p-value in order to bound
the number of false discoveries to α overall. We illus-
trate the process in following example.
Illustrative example: Consider three hypotheses H1,H2,
H3, with p-values p1 = 0.0012, p2 = 0.2331, and p3 =
0.0049, respectively. Set the initial alpha wealthW (0) =
0.05, fixγ =W (0)/4, and let β = 0.25. After testing hypoth-
esis H1 we obtain p1 < α1 so H1 is rejected and we obtain
a “return on investment.” NowW (1) =W (0) + γ = 0.0625.
For the second test, we obtain p2 > α2 so theH2 is accepted
and the remaining wealth isW (2) =W (1) − α j1−α j ≈ 0.01.
For the third test, we get p3 < α j so H3 is rejected and
W (3) ≈ 0.022. Examining the sequence of p-values, it is
trivial to verify the validity of discoveries H1 and H3 by
reapplying Procedure 1 with all three computed p-values.
4.4 Certification of Hypotheses
The goal of STAR is to certify, in a tamper-proof way, that
the insights gained from the available data are valid. Taking
a birds-eye view, for every test computed through STAR, a
publicly auditable certificate ψ is produced which attests
to the application of the α-investing procedure during hy-
pothesis testing process. Formally, we define a certificate
of a statistical test T as a signed tuple (ρ,σ ,τ ) where ρ is
the test index (i.e., the test’s order among all the tests that
have been executed so far on D), σ is the identifier of the
statistical test function T , and τ is the result of executing
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Figure 2: Auditor verifies the validity of reported p-
values by examining the values stored on the log and
ensuring that the α-investing procedure was applied
correctly.
T(D), i.e., the test statistic. Given that the certificate con-
tains both the test index ρ and resulting p-value, it is easy
to verify (in conjunction with previous certificates) whether
the false discovery control procedure was applied correctly
by (re)applying Procedure 1 and verifying the conclusion re-
searchers came to during analysis.Note that the statistical
tests do not need to be re-evaluated in order to verify
the correctness of results; the p-value only has to be
computed once.
5 CONSTRUCTION
We are now ready to describe the system in detail. We start by
describing the cryptographic tools used in realizing STAR and
then formalize the different components of STAR. We note
that the cryptographic techniques used as building-blocks
are well studied and fairly standard but are combined in a
novel and carefully thought out manner to achieve practical
efficiency and meet the goals outlined in § 2.
5.1 Preliminaries
STAR is constructed using the following building blocks:
a tamper-proof ledger for recording all statistical tests ex-
ecuted over a dataset in an auditable fashion, somewhat
homomorphic encryption for evaluating statistical tests over
encrypted data, and multi-party computation for securely
decrypting results and in some cases evaluating parts of the
statistical test circuit. Table 1 provides a summary of the
cryptographic building blocks used and their role in STAR.
Tamper-proof Ledger. We rely on a tamper-proof ledger
abstractionwhichwe call TestLog. The ledger records statisti-
cal test executed on the dataset such that each test result and
order of test execution is publicly available and remains im-
mutable once recorded. In STAR, TestLog can be maintained
by a central authority, by the computing servers themselves
using a consensus protocol (e.g., Paxos [36]), or by inde-
pendent parties (e.g., using a public Blockchain based on a
decentralized consensus protocol such as Nakamoto consen-
sus [39]). Similar to the ledger abstraction used in [10], our
only requirement is that TestLog is correct and available.
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Property Cryptographic Building Block(s) Role in STAR
Access Control Digital signatures & Encryption
Access to data is restricted to the STAR protocol by being encrypted and
hence inaccessible to researchers directly. Moreover, access to the system
is controlled via digital signatures to thwart system abuse by any single
researcher in the form of a denial-of-service attack.
Hypothesis tracking Homomorphic Encryption & Multi-party computation
Computation result are revealed via consensus of computing servers, and
remain hidden otherwise. Researchers cannot test hypotheses outside of
STAR because the data remains encrypted and secret at all times.
Auditability Tamper-proof ledger & Controlled Decryption
Every statistical test computation is recorded in a publicly readable log
at decryption time making test results (and application of false discovery
control procedures) auditable by researchers and third parties.
Table 1: Summary of cryptographic building blocks and their role in realizing the main properties of STAR.
Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption. Somewhat Ho-
momorphic Encryption (SHE) is a special form of asymmetric
encryption where a limited number of computations can be
performed over the encrypted values without knowledge of
the decryption key. In other words, SHE enables the eval-
uation of a limited class of function on encrypted inputs
to obtain an encrypted output. Unlike fully homomorphic
encryption [22], where arbitrary functions can be evaluated
on encrypted inputs (theoretically at least), SHE can only
evaluate a handful of multiplication gates but does not incur
high computational overhead of fully homomorphic encryp-
tion [42].
Multi-partyComputation.Multi-party computation (MPC)
is a set of techniques for computing over secret data that
is shared amongst a set of parties. The data is encoded and
shared in such a way so as to prevent individual parties (or
even a subset of parties) from obtaining any information
about the (secret) data while still allowing for functions to be
evaluated over the encoded data. The importance of MPC is
that functions can be evaluated by the parties while ensuring
that no party learns the input values.
In STAR we use the SPDZ [14, 34] protocol for evaluating
functions in a multi-party setting. SPDZ is the current state-
of-the-art when it comes to performing computations and
is highly efficient in practice. We provide additional details
about the protocol in § 6.
5.2 STAR protocol
We are now ready to describe the construction of STAR. The
functionality of the STAR can be split into three distinct
phases: Setup, ComputeTest, and PerformAudit.
Setup. To initialize the system, the data owner encrypts
a dataset [D] and shares partial decryption keys with the
set of computing servers {S1, . . . ,Sk } such that collectively
they may decrypt computation results. The data owner then
initializes the public log TestLog and posts to it a signed
message (0,⊥,⊥) that corresponds to the counter of the tests
to be executed on D, set to zero. In addition to releasing
the encrypted dataset, the data owner releases metadata
pertaining to D deemed sufficient for researchers to form
hypotheses on the dataset (e.g., attribute metadata, etc). We
formalize the metadata requirements in § 7.
ComputeTest. A researcher uses the encrypted data to eval-
uate a statistical test σ evaluated over a subset of attributes
in D. Once the researcher obtains the encrypted result, she
sends it to the servers {S1, . . . ,Sk } which engage in the
multi-party protocol to decrypt the result. In doing so, the
servers make the result publicly available on TestLog. Re-
call that the test result cannot be recovered by any of the
parties individually and requires all servers to reveal their
shares in order to recover the result. This specification en-
sures that each test result is made publicly available to all
the servers and researchers and the end of the computation.
The decrypted result, in conjunction with the existing data
written to TestLog, is the test certificate consisting of the
tupleψ = (ρ,σ ,τ ).
PerformAudit. A test with certificate ψ = (ρ,σ ,τ ) can be
audited for correctness by any entity with access to TestLog.
An auditor retrieves all certificates up to ρ from TestLog and
uses this information to ensure the α-investing procedure
was applied correctly when claiming a result is statistically
significant. Note that auditing the statistical test results can
be done entirely “offline” using only information recorded on
TestLog – this makes the auditing procedure non-interactive.
Procedure 2: PerformAudit(ψρ = (ρ,σ ,τ ))
1 W (ρ − 1) ← wealth remaining after applying
InvestmentRule(α , β ,γ) up to the p-value of the ρth test;
2 αρ ← min
(
α ,
W (ρ−1)(1−β )
1+W (ρ−1)(1−β )
)
; // see § 4.3
3 Acceptψ as valid if and only if pρ < αρ ;
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6 STATISTICAL TESTS IN STAR
In this section we describe the statistical tests we implement
in STAR and their usage in hypothesis testing. We describe
four very common statistical tests: Student’s t-test, Pearson’s
correlation test, the Chi-squared test, and ANOVA F-test.
While not exhaustive, this set of statistical tests forms a
basis for quantitative analysis and covers many cases: from
reasoning about population means to analyzing differences
between sets of categorical data. These four tests are also
widely used in practice and accounted for more than 70% of
all clinical trials from a pool of 1,828 medical studies from a
variety of journals [16].
With our selection of tests we aim to demonstrate the
versatility and practicality of STAR to real world applications.
Our selection captures both tests used on continuous and
categorical data. Many other statistical tests are close variants
of the statistical tests we describe in this paper and can be
implemented in STAR as well.
6.1 Dataset Characteristics and Notation
Before diving into the equations, we first describe how the
data is structured in STAR, how computations are performed
over encoded data, and introduces some additional notation.
Metadata requirements. First, we formalize which infor-
mation about the data is revealed (resp. hidden) from re-
searchers at setup time. To allow researchers to form hy-
potheses on [D], the data owner is required to releases at-
tributemetadata about the dataset. This includes, for example,
the number of attributes, the type and domain size, indepen-
dence from other attributes, etc.). This is to help researchers
determine what test to use and what hypothesis to test for.
We require that the metadata be such that it is possible to 1)
define a hypothesis onD and 2) that it contain the number of
rows and columns in the dataset, denoted by n,m. Moreover,
since some tests only work on attributes that are indepen-
dent of each other, we require the independence of attributes
(if any) to be contained therein. Finally, we note that we
implicitly set a bound on the attribute domain size (e.g., as-
sume each value can be represented by a 32 bit integer). This
is necessary for the correct selection of the parameters at
system setup time.
Computing p-values from test statistics. We make an
important observation which enables us to more efficiently
apply FDR control procedures in STAR. Each statistical test
produces a test statistic from which p-values are derived
using degrees of freedom (a function of the dataset size). Since
the p-value can be computed “in the clear” using the revealed
test statistic, we do not need to compute the p-value using
secure computation which drastically reduces the complexity
overhead (since obtaining p-values requires lookup tables
in practice; an expensive operation to do over encrypted
data). We therefore focus on describing the computation of
only the test statistic and leave the mapping from test result
to an exact p-value implicit as it can be trivially computed.
We note that in certain situations revealing the test statistic
(and as a result the p-value) can be too much information
since researchers may be able to reconstruct the dataset after
observing a sufficient number of queries. We therefore also
describe how STAR can be adapted to only reveal statistical
significance which bypasses p-value computations altogether.
6.2 STAR for the holdout dataset
While we describe STAR as a general scheme for evaluat-
ing statistical tests on a dataset, in practice, we envision the
dataset D to be split into an exploration dataset Dexp and
a validation dataset Dval . The data owner will encrypt the
dataset Dval and release the encrypted validation dataset
along with the (unencrypted) exploration dataset. This way,
researchers can explore different hypotheses using Dexp
and validate their results through STAR using [Dval ]. In-
deed, this is the way we envision STAR deployed in real
world settings as it mirrors current “best-practices”, but in a
provably certifiable way.
6.3 Hypothesis Testing
We are now ready to describe the four statistical tests imple-
mented in STAR and their usage in hypothesis testing. We
refer the reader to [5] for a additional details on the statistical
tests and their applications.
Student’s t-test is used to compare means of two indepen-
dent samples. The null hypothesis stipulates that there is no
difference between the two distributions [5]. Let x and y be
two independent samples from D. Denote the mean of x , y
as x¯ , y¯, and the standard deviation as sx , sy . The test statistic,
t , is then computed according to:
t ≜
x¯ − y¯
sp
√
2
n
(2)
where sp =
√
(n−1)s2x+(n−1)s2y
2n−2 .
Pearson’s correlation test is used to compare the linear
correlation between two continuous and independent vari-
ables. The test statistic, r , lies in the range [−1, 1], where
either extreme corresponds to negative (resp. positive) corre-
lation between variables [5]. Let x and y be two independent
continuous samples in D. Denote the mean of x and y as
x¯ and y¯. Pearson’s correlation coefficient is computed as
follows:
r ≜
∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)(yi − y¯)√∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2
√∑n
i=1(yi − y¯)2
(3)
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Chi-squared test is used to determine whether there exists
a significant difference between the expected and observed
frequencies in a set of observations from mutually exclusive
categories. The test evaluates the “goodness of fit” between
a set of expected values and observed values.
For a collection of n observations, classified intom mu-
tually exclusive categories, where each observed value is
denoted by xi for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, we denote the probabil-
ity that a value falls into the ith category by ηi such that∑m
i=1 ηi = 1. The Chi-squared statistic is given by:
χ 2 ≜
m∑
i=1
(xi − ei )2
ei
(4)
where ei = nηi .
ANOVAF-test test is commonly used to determine the fit of
a statistical model to a given dataset. Let xi for i = 0, . . . ,m
be independent samples fromD. Denote the mean of xi by x¯i
and the mean across all samples by x¯ . Denote the jth value of
the ith sample by xi, j . The test statistic, F , is then computed
according to:
F ≜
m∑
i=1
n(x¯i − x¯)2
m − 1
/ m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(xi, j − x¯i )2
n −m (5)
6.4 Statistical Test as an Arithmetic Circuit
We now turn to describing how the statistical tests are com-
puted in STAR. The first obstacle in the way of a practical
construction is that somewhat homomorphic encryption is
only viable for circuits with low multiplicative depth. With
practical implementations of homomorphic encryption, it is
only possible to evaluate a few (preferably less than 3) lev-
els of multiplication gates where both inputs are encrypted
but supports many additions and multiplications by public
constants. Observe that each test statistic follows a pattern:
they require only a few multiplication per each term in the
summation followed by a single division. This makes it pos-
sible to efficiently evaluate the numerator and denomina-
tor terms of each statistical test equation using at most 2-3
multiplication operations. However, when it comes to the
final division gate (where both the numerator and denomi-
nator are encrypted), there is no homomorphic operation to
perform it outright. Instead, existing methods require a re-
cursive approach (converting the division gate to a series of
multiplications) which requires a significant number of con-
secutive encrypted multiplications and bars the way towards
any practical implementation. While theoretically we could
use fully-homomorphic encryption to evaluate division gates
using an iterative approach, such an approach would sig-
nificantly blow up the computational complexity (by many
+
+
÷ 
+
+
+
+ Statistical Test Arithmetic Circuit
Evaluated using Multi-party ComputationEvaluated Locally
Ciphertext           Secret Shares  
Figure 3: Evaluation of statistical test circuit in STAR.
Numerator and denominator terms of the test statis-
tic are computed locally by the researcher using the
homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme.
Computing servers then evaluate the division gate se-
curely using multi-party computation and reveal the
result.
orders of magnitude) making the construction impractical
for real-world settings.
Instead, we opt for a hybrid approach: we use the decryp-
tion parties (parties to whom the shares of the secret key gets
distributed to at system setup time) to “boost” the computa-
tional power of encryption scheme and evaluate one division
gates. We can use multi-party computation techniques to
evaluate division gates in the arithmetic circuit of the sta-
tistical test. Since statistical tests that we use to describe
STAR only require one division per evaluation, and at the
very end of the computation, we can evaluate the numera-
tor and denominator locally using somewhat-homomorphic
encryption and then perform the division using the help of
the computing parties. This leads to a practical solution for
evaluating statistical tests precisely because the bulk of the
test can be evaluated locally and thus requires minimal addi-
tional interaction from the parties (where network latency
is a bottleneck). If the majority of the circuit is evaluated
locally, the parties are only needed to evaluate division gates
and thus only need to receive two ciphertexts (numerator
and denominator) which they divide prior to revealing the
result. This provides the best of both worlds when it comes
to practical efficiency. Figure 3 illustrates the process of eval-
uation of a statistical in STAR, where the test is represented
as an arithmetic circuit.
Ciphertext to Share conversion. One caveat, however, is
that in order for parties to perform multi-party computation,
the inputs (e.g., the numerator and denominator for a devi-
sion gate) must be secret shared to all the parties. Normally,
this is done by a trusted party that splits the plaintext inputs
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into shares which are then distributed to each party indi-
vually such that any threshold number of parties can pitch-in
their shares and collectively recover the secret value. In STAR,
however, these shares must be created and distributed on-
the-fly from the encrypted inputs. To achieve this, we use a
multi-party protocol which securely converts an encryption
to a set of shares held by parties. This is achieved using a
protocol that takes as input the ciphertext encrypted under
a public key and results in parties having secret shares of
the previously encrypted value. Such protocols have been
well-studied and are described in [13].
7 SECURITY ANALYSIS
We now analyze the different security properties outlined
in § 2. The security of STAR hinges on the use of the somewhat-
homorphic ecnryption scheme and the multi-party computa-
tion framework used. We opt for the SPDZ multi-party com-
putation framework because it is the current state-of-the-art
when it comes to performing efficient MPC computations.
We use SPDZ to evaluate the division gates in the statisti-
cal test circuit and control the revelation of statistical test
results. Security hinges on the fact that given an encrypted
dataset, researchers are unable to recover the underlying
data to perform covert statistical tests outside of STAR, i.e.,
without requesting a decryption from the parties.
Correctness. STAR follows the plaintext execution of statis-
tical tests by evaluating an arithmetic circuit of the tests over
the encrypted dataset as presented in § 6. The only differ-
ence with a plaintext evaluation compared to the encrypted
evaluation is in the accuracy of the results since STAR guar-
antees O(f )-bits of precision which follows directly from
the parameters used in instantiating the encryption scheme
and SPDZ parties. The precision parameter, f , can be set to
provide an arbitrary decimal places of precision. The default
is usually set to 240 which guarantees at least 12 decimal
places of precision and is more than sufficient for p-value
calculation in most situations 1.
Confidentiality. The aim of STAR is to enforce p-value
calculation in a truthful manner. It achieves this goal by
hiding the content of D and revealing only the metadata
on D sufficient to form hypotheses and compute statistical
significance. The data owner only needs to reveal the size
of the dataset and attribute metadata information on the
contents of D (e.g., characteristics of each attribute, domain
size, and independence from other attributes) 2. Themetadata
is succinctly captured as a function Ls : D → {0, 1}∗, that
1Many p-value calculation tables are rounded to fewer than 5 decimal
places [5].
2For example, metadata for an “age” attribute may be the set {AttrType:
Age, NumericRange: 0-110}). We stress, however, that the metadata can
takes as input the dataset and returns the number of rows
and attributes n,m and other metadata decided on by the
data owner. At setup time, this function captures the exact
“leakage” of D as nothing beyond that is revealed.
There is additional leakage of information on D that re-
sults from the statistical test computation and is captured
by the function Lc : (D × σ ) → σ (D) which is the result
of the statistical test σ computed on D. Confidentiality of
the dataset then follows directly from the fact that the only
information revealed by computing a statistical test (repre-
sented as an arithmetic circuit) over the encrypted dataset
[D] is the output σ (D) (i.e., the result of the statistical test
σ ) and nothing else. If this is deemed too much, the leakage
can be reduced to just revealing significance (we explain
this in the following subsection) in which case only a single
bit of information is leaked when performing a statistical test
through STAR.
Access Control. Though anyone can perform a computa-
tion over [D], the computing servers can enforce “rate limits”
on researchers or refuse to reveal results to researchers who
attempt to abuse the system. This is an important feature
to avoid a situations where a malicious researcher exhausts
the α-investing procedure’s alpha-wealth and prevents other
researchers from testing their hypotheses. While describing
the exact access control policies that could be enforced is out-
side the scope of this work, we emphasize that such policies
can be useful in real-world situations and can be integrated
in the design of STAR by default. For example, the system
can be easily made to enforce daily quotas on the number of
statistical tests that any single researcher can evaluate over
a dataset.
Auditability. All computations are performed securely over
the encrypted dataset [D] where we assume at least one of
the computing servers follows the protocol honestly. Thus,
every resulting decryption is written to TestLog which guar-
antees auditability of all the statistical test result computed
on D. For every certificate ψ = (ρ,σ ,τ ), the sequence of
resulting computations numbered 1 to ρ − 1 can be used to
certify the validity of ψ by auditing the application of the
α-investing procedure as shown in § 4.3. It is important to
note that auditing does not require interaction from the com-
puting parties and can be done fully “offline”,- using only
publicly available information.
7.1 1-bit computation leakage
In some situations, leaking the result of the statistical test
may be deemed to reveal too much about the dataset D. For
be made general and independent of the actual values found in D, when
deemed of no importance to forming hypotheses.
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example, there may be situations where researchers can ex-
ploit the information revealed by a statistical test to make an
estimated guess about the significance of a yet-not-computed
statistical test (effectively cheating the control procedure).
If this is deemed a risk, then the computation leakage can
be reduced to Lc : (D × σ ) → {0, 1} where the only output
of a computation through STAR is a single bit denoting statis-
tical significance and nothing else. This can be achieved by
performing a comparison of the encrypted result τ with a
significance threshold t using secure computation (right after
evaluating the division gate, see Figure 3) and only revealing
the result of this comparison. This potentially sacrifices the
utility of the result since nothing beyond statistical signifi-
cance is revealed but provides the minimum leakage possible
(a single bit). We note that the α-investing procedure still
works (and can be audited as before) because the procedure
only requires the result of this threshold comparison, and
not the p-value itself.
8 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We now turn to demonstrating the applicability of STAR as
a system for providing auditable results to statistical tests
in an efficient way. Our goal is to show that STAR has mini-
mal overhead on the data owner and researchers. Moreover,
since we envision a deployment of STAR where the com-
puting servers are far apart (e.g., universities in the United
States and in Europe), network latency has the potential to
incur significant performance overheads which could be a
problem in practice and we must therefore evaluate care-
fully. Finally, we wish to evaluate the effectiveness of the
α-investing procedure for controlling the FDR to illustrate
why this procedure is an ideal pairing for STAR.
We outline the goals of our evaluation as follows:
• Thoroughly evaluate STAR on a variety of datasets to
measure the overall runtime for all three statistical
tests. Specifically, we wish to show that STAR can
perform in realistic deployment scenarios where the
datasets are sufficiently large in size and servers used
in the final steps of the computation are far apart from
one another.
• Illustrate the effectiveness of the α-investing proce-
dure when it comes to controlling false discoveries
under different dataset characteristics to show why
STARwould be effective at preventing p-hacking when
used as described.
• Measure the impact that network latency, number of
computing servers, and other parameters, introduce
and the effects on the practicality of the STAR.
• Measure the overhead imposed on the data owner at
system setup and on researchers during the evaluation
of statistical tests.
8.1 Implementation and Environment
We implement STAR in C++ using the open source homomor-
phic encryption library SEAL (v3.3.0) [42] and SPDZMPC en-
gine (https://github.com/KULeuven-COSIC/SCALE-MAMBA).
The implementation of statistical tests computes the equa-
tions described in § 6: the SEAL library is used by the data
owner to encrypt the data, researchers use the encrypted
dataset to evaluate statistical tests, and the final result is com-
puted and revealed by parties running the SPDZ protocol.
SEAL does not currently support threshold decryption as de-
scribed in [8, 29], we therefore simulate the evaluation of the
share-conversion protocol (see Figure 3) using the SPDZ par-
ties and a single decryption key by emulating the ciphertext
to share conversion protocol run by the computing parties.
The homomorphic evaluation of the statistical tests were
conducted on a single machine with Intel Xeon E5 (Sandy
Bridge) @ 2.60GHz processor (30 cores per machine) and
120GB of RAM, running Ubuntu 18.04 LTS. The cost of run-
ning the machine was estimated at $914.98/month.
Each computation party was instantiated on a machine
with Intel Xeon E5 (Sandy Bridge) @ 2.60GHz processors
(8 cores per machine) and 15GB of RAM, running Ubuntu
18.04 LTS. The cost of running each party was estimated at
$109.79/month.
Unless otherwise stated, each result is the average over
five separate trial runs (for each combination of parameters).
8.2 Datasets
We evaluate each statistical test on synthetic and real-world
datasets. However, we note that runtime performance is not
impacted by the distribution of the underlying data. Since
the data itself is encrypted, all computations run in the same
amount of time because the evaluation of the statistical tests
is done over the ciphertexts. We evaluate STAR on one real
world dataset which we make the same size as one of the
synthetic datasetsd to illustrate this fact. The characteristics
of the datasets used in our evaluation are summarized in
Table 2.
The real world dataset was obtained from the UC Irvine
Machine Learning Repository [1]. For experiments involving
Student’s t-test, Pearson’s correlation test, andANOVA F-test
(which require continuous data), we use the Abalone dataset
consisting of a total of nine continuous measurements and
4, 177 rows. We truncate the dataset down to 1, 000 rows to
provide a comparison baseline with our synthetic dataset
cont_1k. We do this to illustrate the fact that the only factor
influencing the computational overhead is the size of the
dataset — the synthetic datasets do not advantage STAR in
any way.
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Figure 4: Server configurations used in the evaluation of STAR.
Synthetic datasets.Wegenerate three continuous synthetic
datasets containing 1,000, 5,000 and 10,000 rows, respectively,
with random real value entries sampled from a normal dis-
tribution. We use these datasets to evaluate Student’s t-test,
Pearson’s correlation test, and ANOVA F-test. For evalu-
ating Chi-squared, we generate three categorical datasets
containing 8 mutually exclusive categories. We evaluate the
Chi-squared test on a subset of 2, 5, and 8 mutually exclusive
categories to demonstrate the impact of varying the number
of selected attributes over which the test is performed.
Dataset # rows # attrs. Data type
abalone 1000∗ 8 continuous
cat_1k 1000 8 categorical
cat_5k 5000 8 categorical
cat_10k 10000 8 categorical
cont_1k 1000 3 continuous
cont_5k 5000 3 continuous
cont_10k 10000 3 continuous
Table 2: Summary of dataset characteristics.
∗ We truncate this dataset to 1000 rows to illustrate the fact that
computation time is entirely independent of the data distribution
(as it should be given that the data is encrypted)
8.3 Experiment Setup
To ensure our experiments emulate a potential deployment
scenario (e.g., where servers are maintained by universities
in different geographic regions), we run our experiments
with five different configurations. We set up servers in three
different locations in the USA (South Carolina, Virginia, Ore-
gon) as well as Germany, Brazil, and Japan with 3-5 parties
depending on the configuration. We report each of the five
configurations in Figure 4. Our choice of server configura-
tions allows us to evaluate the effects of network latency in
a deployed scenario. The first configuration consists of all
three servers located in the same datacenter (South Carolina)
which results in parties being connected on the local area
network (LAN) with “ideal” network latency. We use this
configuration as as reference point to analyze the impact of
settings where servers are further apart.
8.4 Parameters
To ensure all tests are evaluated in a way that enables com-
parisons between results, we fix the parameters ahead of
time to satisfy the requirements imposed by all four statisti-
cal tests and datasets. Specifically, we set fixed-point scaling
factor f = 40 which provides up to 12 decimal places of pre-
cision for each computation and is sufficient for computing
precise p-values. We set the statistical security parameter
κ = 40 which provides 40-bits of statistical security during
multi-party computations and is the default choice [14]. In
words, this parameter ensures that the probability of a com-
putation leaking information about a secret value is less than
1
2κ , which is negligible in κ.
8.5 Results
We describe the results in four parts which roughly corre-
spond to the goals outlined at the beginning of this section.
System setup. Across all experiments, the setup time STAR
(i.e., time required to encode and encrypt the data) remained
below 32 minutes per dataset. We report the setup time for
each dataset in Figure 8. We stress that this is only a one-time
operation needed at setup time: after the dataset is encrypted,
the data owner goes offline and does not need to interact
with researchers or perform any further computation.
Computation runtime. Since we implement STAR using
the SEAL homomorphic encryption library and the SPDZ
multi-party computation engine, we split the runtime evalu-
ation into two phases: offline and online. The offline phase is
where researchers evaluate the statistical test arithmetic cir-
cuit using homomorphic encryption to obtain the numerator
and denominator terms. In the online phase, the researchers
provide the evaluated numerator and denominator cipher-
texts to the computing parties which then engage in a multi-
party computation to evaluate the division and reveal the
statistical test result. We report the runtime of each statistical
test in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Total computation time (mm:ss) required for
each test as a function of the computing server config-
uration and dataset selection. Offline runtime is pre-
sented in solid color; online runtime is cross-hatched.
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Figure 8: Data owner setup time (mm:ss) for each
dataset used in the evaluation.
The runtime of computing statistical tests ranged from
a few seconds to approximately 9 minutes on the larger
datasets. Even though this is several orders of magnitude
overhead compared to computing a statistical test directly
over the unencrypted data (e.g., using SciPy), it is not un-
reasonably high when considering practical circumstances.
Researchers in the real world are likely to only evaluate a
few statistical tests on a dataset per day which STAR is adept
at handling, even with many researchers using the system.
The results also illustrate the overhead of performing multi-
party computation. In Figure 5 we see that the online time
accounted for a significant fraction of the computation time,
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even though it is only used for evaluating the division gate
and revealing the result. This confirms that evaluating the
full statistical test over shared data using multi-party com-
putation would incur an unreasonably high overhead on the
runtime for a practical application.
Discovery certification. To demonstrate how STAR per-
forms at its main goal of discovery certification, we evaluate
the α-investing procedure for controlling false discoveries.
For evaluating the FDRwith andwithout theα-investing con-
trol procedure, we generate one hundred synthetic datasets
with values ranging between 0 and 100 across 64 attributes
and 1,000 rows. For each dataset we perform 64 “multiple
comparisons” using each of the three tests over a subset of
2 attributes. We repeat this process for four dataset collec-
tions where each collection contains a different percentage of
true null hypotheses (e.g., 100% implies completely random
data and so all “discoveries” are false). We report the results
in Figure 6. The results show that the α-investing proce-
dure indeed bounds the expected FDR to the specified alpha
(α = 0.05), even when all discoveries in the data are false.
We additionally report the α-budget remaining after each
test (following Procedure 1) in Figure 7. We use the same
generated datasets and set the initial wealthW (0) = 0.05
and parameters β = 0.5, γ = 0.0125. As expected, the budget
is never fully depleted but quickly decreases in the case of
datasets with a large portion of null hypotheses.
9 RELATEDWORK
Much of the related work surrounding STAR either focuses
on private computations using homomorphic encryption or
non-cryptographic methods for preventing p-hacking such
as pre-registration of hypotheses. To our knowledge, there
has been no prior work using cryptographic techniques for
certifying the validity of statistical tests in a provable and
fully auditable way.
Sornette et al. [44] describe an approach for demonstrating
the validity of stock market bubble predictions a posteriori.
Their method relies on hashing documents containing finan-
cial forecasts which get released after the forecasted date has
passed. Coupled with a trusted entity for storing the hashes,
their method provides a means of validating the historical
accuracy of predictions in an unbiased way. While their solu-
tion isn’t directly applicable to hypotheses testing, the main
goal of their work is comparable to ours.
Dwork et al. [18, 19] propose a method that constrains an-
alyst’s access to a hold-out dataset as follows. A trusted party
keeps a hold-out dataset and answers up tom hypotheses
using a differentially private algorithm. Here,m depends on
the size of the hold-out data and the generalization error that
one is willing to tolerate. Hence, compared to our decentral-
ized approach, this method assumes trust into a single party
that (1) does not release the dataset to the researchers and
(2) stops answering queries when more thanm hypotheses
queries. Moreover, the method introduces random noise into
the results which can potentially alter the outcome of the
computed test.
Lauter et al. [37] and Zhang et al.[50] propose the use
of homomorphic encryption to compute statistical tests on
encrypted genomic data. However, the constructions are
not intended for validating statistical testing procedures but
rather for guarding the privacy of patient data. Furthermore,
Lauter et al. make several simplifications such as not per-
forming encrypted division (rather performing arithmetic
division in the clear), imposing assumptions on the data, etc.,
making their solution less general compared to methods for
computing statistical tests in STAR.
Homomorphic encryption and multi-party computation
techniques have been used for outsourcing machine learn-
ing tasks of private data [9, 24, 48, 49]. Our work, however,
crucially relies on the decryption functionality being decen-
tralized in order to control and keep track of data exposure.
Other related work surrounds non-cryptographic tech-
niques to guard against false discoveries in statistical analy-
sis. This includes procedures such as the α-investing proce-
dure [20, 51] and other methods for bounding the number of
false discoveries [4, 17]. When applied properly these tech-
niques prevent p-hacking in an idealized scenario but they
provide no guarantee that the methods were are applied
correctly which is why the system we describe becomes a
necessity.
Finally, we note that preserving privacy of dataset values
when releasing results of statistical tests [21, 31] is orthogo-
nal to our work.
10 CONCLUSIONS
We present STAR, a system that certifies hypothesis testing
using cryptographic techniques and a decentralized certify-
ing authority to eliminate avenues for p-hacking and other
forms of data dredging. STAR computes statistical test over
encrypted data by combining somewhat homomorphic en-
cryption with multi-party computation in a way that enables
efficient and practical evaluation yet provides full auditabil-
ity of results. We show that STAR supports a wide range of
statistical tests used in practice for hypothesis testing and
evaluate four of the most common tests used by researchers.
Our experiments demonstrate the feasibility of such a system
for real-word settings and only incurs a small computational
overhead on researchers evaluating tests. As such, we believe
that STAR is a viable solution to prevent p-hacking in a prov-
able way, promoting accountability and reproducibility in
scientific studies. With STAR, data can be released for public
use with the guarantee that the insights extracted from the
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data are correct and all necessary false discovery control
procedures were applied. STAR is the first system which ad-
dress p-hacking and fosters reproducibility by providing a
certificate-of-correctness and enabling post hoc auditing of
all actions taken by researchers.
⋆
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